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About this Report 
This report was produced at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for 
Economic Development (UWMCED), a unit of the College of Letters and Science at 
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The College established UWMCED in 
1990, to provide university research and technical assistance to community 
organizations and units of government working to improve the Greater Milwaukee 
economy.  In 2000, UWMCED also became part of UWM’s “Milwaukee Idea,” as 
one of the core units of the “Consortium for Economic Opportunity.” The analysis 
and conclusions presented in this report are solely those of UWMCED and do not 
necessarily reflect the views and opinions of UW-Milwaukee, or any of the 
organizations providing financial support to the Center. 
The author of this report is Dr. Marc V. Levine, Professor and Director of the 
UWMCED. Lauren McHargue and Lisa Williams, policy analysts at the Center, 
provided indispensable research assistance. 
The UWMCED strongly believes that informed public debate is vital to the 
development of good public policy. The Center publishes briefing papers, detailed 
analyses of economic trends and policies, and “technical assistance” reports on 
issues of applied economic development. In these ways, as well as in conferences 
and public lectures sponsored by the Center, we hope to contribute to public 
discussion on economic development policy in Southeastern Wisconsin. 
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Further information about the Center and its reports and activities is available at 
our web site: www.ced.uwm.edu
 Executive Summary 
The latest statistics on income, employment, and business development offer 
mixed news on the economic health of Milwaukee’s inner city. The good news: after 
decades of decline, economic conditions in the inner city have stabilized. Since 1999, 
real income and the number of business establishments have risen slightly in the 
inner city, and the number of jobs in inner city neighborhoods has fallen by less than 
one percent since 1994. 
However, the bad news is that although inner city economic conditions have 
improved recently, the gains have been slight compared to the losses of the 1990s, 
leaving the inner city in worse shape today than a decade ago. Income per taxpayer 
in the inner city remains less than half the level of metro Milwaukee as a whole. In 
addition, there has been no net job growth in the inner city since 1994, limiting 
economic opportunity for residents. Slow employment growth throughout the region 
since 1999 has further damaged job prospects for inner city dwellers. 
Two other notable trends emerge from the latest data. First, inner city economic 
improvements have been limited to a few neighborhoods, chiefly those ringing 
downtown, where substantial gentrification has occurred. Other neighborhoods in the 
inner city continue to experience falling incomes and a shrinking employment base. 
Second, portions of the city’s Northwest Side have witnessed significant 
economic decline since 1994, looking more and more like an embryonic “second” 
inner city in Milwaukee. Decline on the Northwest Side suggests that Milwaukee is 
experiencing a territorial “rearrangement” of economic distress, with some inner city 
neighborhoods showing gains, others still declining, and still other neighborhoods on 
the Northwest Side falling into deep economic difficulty. But the overall result is no 
net improvement in neighborhood economic conditions – hence, the precipitous rise 
in the city’s poverty rate since 2000. 
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Milwaukee has been awash in inner city initiatives since the early 1990s, but the 
impact of these efforts has been modest, at best. In particular, this report critiques the 
“Initiative for a Competitive Milwaukee” which, three years after its launch, has 
done nothing to advance economic development in the inner city. Civic leaders have 
also begun to promote “regional cooperation” in economic development, and this 
report examines the potential contribution of regional policies to inner city economic 
renewal. 
Finally, we explore eight policy implications of the latest data on inner city 
economic conditions. These include: 
• Milwaukee needs a comprehensive inner city redevelopment and anti-poverty 
strategy; 
 
• Metro Milwaukee should embrace regional equity strategies; 
 
• Corporate Milwaukee needs to step up to the plate for the inner city; 
 
• The City of Milwaukee should rethink some of its economic development strategies, 
particularly investments in tourism; 
 
• Restructuring the Milwaukee Department of City Development will be essential to 
implementing an inner city revitalization strategy; 
 
• Gentrification is not a dirty word; 
 
• A community benefits agreement should be part of every major redevelopment deal 
in Milwaukee; 
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• Milwaukee needs a “big bang” to stimulate inner city revitalization. 
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Introduction 
The latest statistics on income, employment, and business development offer 
mixed news on the economic health of Milwaukee’s inner city.1  First, the good 
news: After 30 years of relentless and sometimes precipitous decline,2 economic 
conditions in the inner city show signs of stabilizing. Since 1994, the number of jobs 
in inner city neighborhoods has remained relatively steady and since 1999, income 
per taxpayer in the inner city, adjusted for inflation, has actually nudged slightly 
upward.  
However, the bad news is that while the economic decline of Milwaukee’s inner 
city appears to have reached a bottom in the 1990s, there has not been significant 
economic improvement from this nadir. Income per taxpayer in the inner city 
remains less than half the level of the metropolitan area as a whole, and in some 
neighborhoods of the inner city, income is barely one-third of the metro area 
average.  Although job loss has slowed in the inner city since 1994, there has been 
no net employment growth since then, seriously limiting economic opportunity for 
inner city residents. Moreover, since 1999 there has been slow job growth 
throughout the entire Milwaukee region; this stagnation, combined with persistent 
racial segregation in the metro area’s labor market, has limited opportunities for 
inner city job-seekers.  
The recent economic data also reveal two new and troubling trends that pose 
serious challenges for Milwaukee’s civic leadership. First, the small improvements 
in employment and income that have occurred in the inner city since 1999 have been 
limited to a few neighborhoods, chiefly those ringing downtown Milwaukee, where 
substantial gentrification has occurred. Other neighborhoods in the inner city 
                                                     
1 In this report, we use the geographic boundaries delineated by the City of Milwaukee to identify the nine zip codes 
(53204, 53205, 53206, 53208, 53210, 53212, 53216, 53218, 53233) that city officials have used since the 1990s to 
define the inner city in federal grant applications and redevelopment plans. A note on terminology: sometimes, careless 
writers use the label central city to describe these neighborhoods. But, “central city” has a precise meaning, defined by 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census as the (entire) city, as opposed to suburbs or metropolitan areas. Consequently, academic 
researchers use the label of “inner city” or “ghetto” to describe the troubled neighborhoods of the “urban core,” and we 
follow the accepted academic usage here.  
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2 For a full analysis of the economic decline of Milwaukee’s inner city since the 1970s, see Marc V. Levine, The 
Economic State of Milwaukee’s Inner City: 1970-2000 (Milwaukee: UW-Milwaukee Center for Economic 
Development, 2002). 47pp.  
continue to experience falling incomes and shrinking employment. In short, there 
appear to be “two inner cities” emerging in Milwaukee: one in which gentrification 
and modest job growth have generated visible neighborhood improvement; and 
another inner city in which economic opportunity continues to diminish. 
Second, although conditions in the “traditional” inner city appear to have 
stabilized since 1999, “inner-city” economic conditions have spread north and west 
to neighborhoods on Milwaukee’s Northwest Side. The number of jobs has 
contracted sharply in Northwest Side neighborhoods since 1999, and real incomes 
have dropped there as well. In short, rather than any substantial inner city revival, 
Milwaukee is simply witnessing a geographic shift in economic distress, with some 
inner city neighborhoods showing gains, others still declining, and still others, 
particularly on the Northwest Side, falling into deep economic difficulty, poised to 
become in effect, a “new” inner city.  
This report will analyze the latest indicators on the economic health of 
Milwaukee’s inner city. In addition, we will explore the policy implications of these 
latest trends. Milwaukee has been awash in “inner city” initiatives since the early 
1990s, yet the results of these efforts have been modest, at best, in reviving inner city 
neighborhoods and improving economic opportunity for inner city residents. The 
recent U.S. Census Bureau data on Milwaukee’s rising city-wide poverty rate since 
2000 confirm the continuing nature of this city’s deep economic crisis. It is long past 
time for new directions in inner city economic development strategy: nothing less 
than the future of Milwaukee as a city of economic opportunity and livable 
neighborhoods is at stake. 
 
Employment Trends in the Inner City, 1994-2003 
Table 1 arrays the most recent data on the number of jobs located in Milwaukee’s 
inner city neighborhoods since 1994. The data are derived from the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, County Business Patterns, which began publishing jobs data on a zip 
code level in 1994.  
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Since 1994, Milwaukee’s inner city has lost 574 jobs, or 0.7 percent of its 
employment base. The rate of decline has been somewhat steeper if we consider 
simply the period since 1999 (the inner city actually gained 177 jobs between 1994 
and 1999). On the whole, however, the jobs data suggest that after two decades of 
disinvestment and steep employment declines, the inner city labor market bottomed 
out in the mid-1990s and has remained flat ever since.  
Table 1: 
Jobs Located in the Inner City Zip Codes, 1994-2003 
Zip Code # of Jobs 
1994 
# of Jobs 
1999 
# of Jobs 
2003 
% change, 
1994-1999 
% change, 
1999-2003 
%change, 
1994-2003
53204 16,220 17,127 17,262 +5.6% +0.8% +6.4%
53205 2,581 2,178 2,097 -15.6% -3.7% -18.8%
53206 1,313 1,589 1,644 +21.0% +3.5% +25.2%
53208 10,786 13,381 12,731 +24.1% -4.9% +18.0%
53210 7,682 7,480 5,724 -2.6% -23.5% -25.5%
53212 12,811 11,536 15,289 -10.0% +32.5% +19.3%
53216 11,694 10,619 7,125 -9.2% -32.9% -39.1%
53218 7,655 6,259 6,029 -18.2% -3.7% -21.2%
53233 16,459 17,211 18,728 +4.6% +8.8% +13.8%
Inner City 
Total 
87,203 87,380 86,629 +0.2% -0.9% -0.7%
Source: CED analysis of U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, employment data by zip code, 
1994-2003. 
 
As we will examine shortly, this stagnation in the overall inner city jobs market 
constitutes a major obstacle to economic opportunity for inner city residents.  
Moreover, if we probe a little deeper into the data, we find that these aggregate 
employment figures mask an increasingly problematic trend of uneven development 
within the inner city. As Table 2 shows, the inner city job market has fragmented into 
“two inner cities” since 1994. In one cluster of zip codes (53204, 53206, 53208, 
53212, and 53233), the number of jobs increased by 8,065 (a healthy 14.0 percent) 
between 1994 and 2003.  Gains were particularly pronounced in zip code 53212, 
which includes the lower King Drive-Brewers Hill areas (which saw the opening of a 
new YWCA, expansion of the offices of Time-Warner cable, and some commercial 
development after 1999) and the East Capitol Drive area (which witnessed  
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substantial commercial development after 1999, including the opening of a Wal-
Mart). Most impressively, the employment gains in this inner city zip code cluster 
were almost double the metro Milwaukee average between 1994-2003 (14.0 percent 
to 7.3 percent), and between 1999-2003, when the number of jobs in metro 
Milwaukee declined by 1.5 percent, this “gainer cluster” in the inner city 
experienced a robust 7.9 percent increase in job growth (see Tables 2 and 3).  
Unfortunately, the job growth in the “gainer” cluster of the inner city was more 
than counterbalanced by a second cluster of inner city zip codes (53205, 53210, 
53216, and 53218) that lost a combined 8,637 jobs, or a whopping 29.2 percent of its 
employment base between 1994-2003. Major layoffs or plant closings at Master 
Lock (53210), Tower Automotive (53216), Northwest General Hospital (53216), 
Eaton Corporation (53216) and Steeltech (53208) accounted for almost two-thirds of 
the 5,561 job losses occurring in the declining inner city zip codes between 1999 and 
2003. Clearly, in these inner city zip codes that have historically been important 
locations for manufacturing employment, the ongoing deindustrialization of 
Milwaukee continues to devastate neighborhood labor markets. As we will see 
shortly, this problem was exacerbated for inner city job seekers after 1999 by the 
significant erosion of employment –in industrial and service sectors alike—on 
Milwaukee’s Northwest Side, in neighborhoods just north and west of the traditional 
inner city.  
Table 2: 
The Two Inner Cities:  Job Growth Since 1994  
Zip 
Codes 
# of Jobs 
1994 
# of Jobs 
1999 
# of Jobs 
2003  
%change 
1994-1999 
% change 
1999-2003 
% change 
1994-2003
 
“Gainers” 
Cluster 
57,589 60,844 65,654 +5.3% +7.9% +14.0%
“Losers” 
Cluster 
29,612 26,536 20,975 -10.4% -21.0% -29.2%
Gainers: 53204, 53206, 53208, 53212, 53233    Source: See Table 1 
Losers: 53205, 53210, 53216, 53218 
 
Tables 3 and 4 put these inner city trends into a broader context, comparing job 
growth figures in several different geographic settings in the Milwaukee region. 
Three observations are immediately apparent from the data. First, between 1994 and 
1999 --as well as for the 1994 to 2003 period taken as a whole-- the rate of job 
creation in the inner city lagged far behind the rates in metro Milwaukee, downtown 
Milwaukee, and the exurban “WOW” counties (Waukesha, Washington, and 
Ozaukee counties).   
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Table 3: 
Job Growth in Selected Areas of Greater Milwaukee, 1994-2003 
Area # of Jobs 
1994 
# of Jobs 
1999 
# of Jobs 
2003 
% change 
1994-99 
% change 
1999-2003 
% change 
1994-2003
Inner City 87,203 87,380 86,629 +0.2% -0.9% -0.7%
Downtown* 68,949 73,519 72,767 +6.6% -1.1% +5.5%
Northwest 
Side*** 
54,222 55,307 48,687 +2.0% -12.0% -10.2%
Metro 
Milwaukee 
711,429 775,261 763,305 +9.0% -1.5% +7.3%
WOW 
Counties** 
247,636 302,614 298,270 +22.2% -1.4% +20.5%
*Downtown zip codes: 53202, 53203    Source: See Table 1 
**WOW counties: Waukesha, Ozaukee, Washington 
***Northwest Side zip codes: 53218, 53223, 53224, 53225 
 
 Second, between 1999 and 2003 job creation stagnated throughout metro 
Milwaukee –in all of these geographic settings—and the inner city trends during this 
period were in line with regional trends. 3  
Third, particularly since 1999, the job base on the City of Milwaukee’s 
Northwest Side appears to have collapsed, with a stunning erosion of 12 percent in 
the number of jobs in the neighborhood in just four years between 1999-2003. The 
disinvestment and job loss that has plagued Milwaukee’s “traditional” inner city has 
now spread to the city’s Northwest Side.  
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3 Moreover, the most recent data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that job growth continues to be 
elusive in the Milwaukee region; according to the BLS, metro Milwaukee lost 5,218 jobs between March 2003 and 
March 2005. Although the “WOW” counties resumed modest job growth, gaining 7,962 jobs between 2003 and 2005, 
Milwaukee County lost over 13,000 jobs during this period (2.6 percent of the county’s employment base). Although 
zip code data is available only through 2003, the continued hemorrhaging of jobs in Milwaukee County during this 
period suggests that it is highly unlikely that inner city employment has increased since 2003.   For post-2003 
employment data, see U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (www.bls.gov). 
Table 4: 
Net Job Growth in Selected Areas of Greater Milwaukee, 1994-2003 
Area Net Job Growth 
1994-1999 
Net Job Growth 
1999-2003 
Net Job Growth 
1994-2003 
Inner City +177 -751 -574
Downtown +4,570 -752 +3,818
Northwest Side -479 -6,212 -6,691
WOW Counties +54,978 -4,344 +50,634
Milwaukee Co. +8,854 -7,612 +1,242
Metro 
Milwaukee 
+63,832 -11,956 +51,876
Source:  See Table 1 
These employment trends have had profound consequences for the inner city 
labor market and economic opportunity for inner city residents. Declining 
employment in inner city and Northwest Side neighborhoods since 1999, combined 
with declining employment elsewhere in the region, has meant that there have been 
few opportunities in recent years for predominantly minority inner city jobless to 
secure jobs. Consequently, it is not surprising that the most recent data from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics show that 54 percent of working age African-American 
males in Milwaukee are either unemployed or no longer even in the labor force.4  
Digging a little beneath these aggregate figures reveals the seriousness of the 
employment situation for inner city residents. Since 1994, virtually all of the net job 
growth in the Milwaukee region (97.6 percent of net new jobs) has occurred in the 
exurban counties of Waukesha, Washington, and Ozaukee (see Table 4). Yet, 
obstacles such as Milwaukee’s entrenched residential segregation and inadequate 
regional transportation links have severely limited access of primarily minority 
residents of the inner city to the exurban labor market.5  Economists and sociologists  
refer to this phenomenon as a “spatial mismatch” in regional labor markets: 
unemployed workers residing in places inaccessible to geographic areas in the region  
 
                                                     
4 See analysis of BLS data in Marc V. Levine, After the Boom: Jobless in Milwaukee Since 2000 (Milwaukee: UW-
Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, 2004). 
UWM Center for Economic Development© 11
5 See Joel Rast and Chieko Maene, Transportation Equity and Access to Jobs in Metro Milwaukee (Milwaukee: UWM 
Center for Economic Development, 2004). 
where job growth is occurring. Thus, as Table 5 shows, through 2000, just over 
8,500 black workers in metro Milwaukee –around 11 percent of all black workers in 
the region6-- had secured employment in the exurban counties, representing a tiny 
fraction of the exurban workforce. Although less segregated into inner city 
workplaces than blacks, only 26.3 percent of metro Milwaukee’s Hispanic workers 
were employed in “WOW” county workplaces. Moreover, given the stagnation in 
job growth throughout the regional labor market since 2000, there is no reason to 
believe that Milwaukee’s spatial mismatch has improved since then.   
Although almost all of metro Milwaukee’s job growth occurred in exurbia during 
the 1990s, downtown Milwaukee was one of the few bright spots in the city of 
Milwaukee’s labor market during the decade. Downtown gained 4,570 jobs between 
1994 and 1999, before falling back slightly during the 1999-2003 period. However, 
in a city that became “majority-minority” according to the 2000 census, blacks made 
up only 13.3 percent of the downtown workforce, and Hispanics only 5.2 percent 
(see Table 5). What’s more, over three-fifths (61.2 percent) of these minority 
workers earned under $25,000 a year.7  In short, not only is job growth downtown 
providing few employment opportunities for the predominantly minority workers of 
Milwaukee’s inner city, but the bulk of the downtown jobs secured by minority 
workers do not pay a living wage. 8
                                                     
6 By contrast, 43.1 percent of metro Milwaukee’s white workers were employed in the exurban counties in 2000. This 
racial disparity is equally apparent when we take in account all suburban employment (i.e. the WOW counties and the 
Milwaukee County suburbs): While 29.7 percent of metro Milwaukee’s black workers are employed in the suburbs, 
67.1 percent of the region’s white workforce holds a job in suburbia. 
7 CED analysis of U.S. Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) data on place of work, based on 2000 census. 
Data available in “drill downs” compiled by UWM’s Employment and Training Institute (www.uwm.edu/Dept/ETI). 
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8 The degree to which downtown redevelopment has failed to deliver economically for inner city residents was first 
documented in an extensive survey reported in Marc V. Levine and John F. Zipp, Downtown Redevelopment: in 
Milwaukee: Has it Delivered for the City? (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic Development, 1994). The 2000 
census data confirm that little changed in this regard during the 1990s. 
Table 5: 
Minorities Working in Selected Metro Milwaukee Locations, 2000 
Location Total 
Workforce
Black 
Workforce
Hispanic 
Workforce
Black % 
of Total 
Hispanic 
% of total
City of Milwaukee 
(excluding downtown) 
222,674 41,432 14,958 18.6% 6.7%
Downtown 
Milwaukee9
62,645 8,345 3,250 13.3% 5.2%
Milwaukee County 
Suburbs 
178,605 14,649 7.731 8.2% 4.3%
Waukesha County 208,470 6,553 7,213 3.1% 3.5%
Washington County 48,490 731 982 1.5% 2.0%
Ozaukee County 39,130 1,250 1,075 3.2% 2.7%
Metro Milwaukee 760,014 72,960 35,209 9.6% 4.6%
Source: CED analysis of U.S. Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) data on place of work, based on 
2000 census.  
 
Thus, during the 1990s, as the inner city produced no new net jobs and as the job 
base on Milwaukee’s Northwest Side collapsed, the growing job markets of exurbia 
and downtown were offering few jobs for predominantly minority inner city 
residents. Since 1999, however, job growth everywhere in metro Milwaukee –
including the inner city and the Northwest Side-- has ground to a halt, further 
exacerbating the employment crisis of the inner city. 
One final note on the employment picture in Milwaukee’s inner city. For the past 
fifteen years, beginning with the hyperbole of former Mayor John Norquist about 
“market-driven” economic development in Milwaukee’s inner city and culminating 
in Harvard professor /consultant Michael Porter’s pronouncement of the 
“competitive advantage of the inner city,”10 a myth has taken hold in Milwaukee: 
that excessive government has been holding back the inner city economy and that the 
private sector is poised to recognize these competitive advantages and create 
meaningful employment opportunities in the inner city. On the face of it, these 
observations were more ideological than factual: as noted earlier, in broad swaths of 
                                                     
9 Place of work data is available from CTPP only by census tracts (as opposed to zip code boundaries used earlier). 
Consequently, there are slight differences in the geographic definition of downtown in this table as opposed to Table 3, 
and therefore there is a slight difference in the total employment reported for downtown in Table 5 compared to Table 3. 
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10 See Porter’s seminal article, “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” Harvard Business Review (May-June 
1995): 55-71.  
the inner city and the Northwest Side after 1999, it was private disinvestment, not 
government action, that cost the city thousands of jobs. 
In fact, as Table 6 illustrates, because of systematic private disinvestment of the 
past decades, the employment base of inner city neighborhoods is now particularly 
reliant on government or non-profit sector jobs. Put another way, without 
government and non-profit investment, the employment crisis of Milwaukee’s inner 
city would be even more serious than it is.    
Table 6: 
Sectoral Composition of Jobs in Selected Locations in Metro Milwaukee, 2000 
Location # of Workers 
(place of work) 
% private 
sector 
% self-
employed 
% government
non-profit* 
King Drive 1,085 44.7% 9.7% 45.6%
27th and North 1,135 39.2% 7.3% 53.5%
Milwaukee 
Enterprise 
Community 
11,959 54.1% 5.5% 40.4%
Waukesha County 208,470 79.1% 7.5% 13.4%
Ozaukee County 39,130 75.1% 9.6% 15.3%
*Includes federal, state, and local government; non-profit agencies, and social service agencies 
Source: Same as Table 5 
 
In truly “market driven” labor markets, such as the exurban counties of 
Waukesha and Ozaukee, government and non-profit employment constitutes less 
than 15 percent of the total job base.11 By contrast, in Milwaukee’s “Enterprise 
Community,” the city-designated heart of the inner city, “non-market” employment 
represents over 40 percent of the job base, and in some inner city neighborhoods 
such as King Drive or around 27th and North –extolled by city leaders as exemplars 
of market-driven development—the “non-market” employment share is even higher. 
In short, as Merrill Goozner put it in his trenchant critique of Michael Porter’s 
approach to inner city revitalization: “If [inner] cities do have latent competitive 
advantages…the market has spectacularly failed to grasp them in recent years.”12
Take the example of King Drive, frequently cited as a model of “market-driven” 
inner city revitalization in Milwaukee. King Drive does have visible stretches of 
                                                     
11 In calling today’s exurban economies “market driven,” we should not forget the historical role of government policy –
in transportation, housing, and tax incentives—that made suburbia possible. 
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12 Merrill Goozner, “The Porter Prescription, The American Prospect, 9:38 (May-June 1998): 60. 
commercial development, particularly south of North Avenue but also extending 
spottily up to Locust Street. However, government and non-profit organizations 
account for nearly half the jobs in the King Drive area (see Table 6). It is agencies 
such as the YWCA, the United Way, the Department of Natural Resources, the U.S. 
Post Office, or the MLK Health Center –as well as quasi-regulated utilities such as 
Time Warner Cable—that have provided the most substantial boost to King Drive 
employment in the past decade. In fact, a much more plausible argument for 
improvements along King Drive would center on the role of public and non-profit 
investment, not the “rediscovery” of the competitive advantages of the inner city by 
the private market. To the extent that private investment is creating jobs along King 
Drive and elsewhere in the inner city, it has been in the aftermath of significant 
public investment. In short, as we will examine later in this report, given the failure 
of the private market to revitalize Milwaukee’s inner city, public leveraging will be 
absolutely essential if meaningful improvement in the inner city jobs crisis is to 
occur. 
 
Income Trends in Milwaukee’s Inner City: 1990-2004 
The most recent data on income trends in Milwaukee neighborhoods are 
available from the State of Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR). Although the 
DOR data on adjusted gross income (AGI) per tax return are not precise equivalents 
of the preferred measure of income -household income- the DOR data do give us a 
reasonable estimate of income trends in various geographic locations throughout the 
region, including the inner city. Most importantly, the DOR data are much more up-
to-date than census data, giving us the opportunity to assess recent trends in income 
growth in the inner city.13 
Table 7 shows trends in inflation-adjusted income per tax return in the various 
zip codes of Milwaukee’s inner city over the past fifteen years. Since 1990, real 
taxpayer income in the inner city as a whole has declined 2.8 percent; however, since  
1999, there has been a modest 1.6 percent increase in real inner city income (not 
quite counterbalancing the 4.3 percent income decline during the “booming” 
nineties). During the 1990s, seven of the nine inner city zip codes experienced 
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13 See appendix for discussion of the strengths and limitations of this data source.  
declines in real taxpayer income; between 1999 and 2004, however, six of the nine 
zip codes witnessed increases in real income. For the entire 1990-2004 period, 
however, six of the inner city nine zip codes experienced declines in real income per 
taxpayer. 
As it happens, since 1990, virtually all of the inner city income gains have been 
concentrated in two zip codes: 53205 (+18.8 percent) and 53212 (+14.4 percent). 
These zip codes encompass the revitalized Brewers Hill neighborhood (53212) as 
well as the moderate-income housing developments of Lindsay Heights and 
CityHomes (53205). Brewers Hill, of course, represents, along with Walker’s Point, 
Milwaukee’s most conspicuous gentrification success, and the sharp increase in real 
income in 53212 is undoubtedly attributable to the influx of affluent households in 
Brewers Hill rather than substantial income gains for existing residents. In zip code 
53205, despite impressive income improvement since 1990 (particularly since 1999), 
this neighborhood still remains among the poorest in Milwaukee. Moreover, the 12 
percent decline in the number of tax filers in zip code 53205 between 1999 and 2004 
suggests that at least some of the increase in average income in this neighborhood 
may have simply been the result of poor residents moving out.14 As the analysis of 
2000 census data in the UWMCED report, The Economic State of Milwaukee’s Inner 
City: 1970-2000 showed, there has been a “hollowing out” of Milwaukee’s 
traditional inner city since the 1980s, with massive population decline in inner city 
neighborhoods accompanied by migration to the Northwest Side of the city (as well 
as out of Milwaukee entirely, primarily to Southern states in a “reverse migration” of 
earlier years).15     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 According to DOR special tabulations for UWMCED, the number of tax filers in zip code 53205 declined from 3,776 
to 3,311 between 1999 and 2004. 
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15 Levine, The Economic State of Milwaukee’s Inner City: 1970-2000, pp. 35-38. On so-called “reverse migration” to 
the South, see the forthcoming UWMCED report, Migration Trends and the Economic State of Milwaukee (Milwaukee: 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, 2006). 
Table 7: 
 Income Trends in Milwaukee’s Inner City, 1990-2004 
(Real income per tax return in inner city zip codes, in constant 2004 dollars) 
Zip Code 1990 
Income 
1999 
Income 
2004 
Income 
%change, 
1990-1999 
% change, 
1999-2004 
%change, 
1990 -2004 
53204 $21,580 $20,524 $21,422 -4.9% +4.4% -0.7%
53205 $17,458 $17,775 $20,732 +1.8% +16.6% +18.8%
53206 $20,495 $19,042 $19,112 -7.1% +0.4% -6.7%
53208 $28,085 $28,610 $29,183 +1.9% +2.0% +3.9%
53210 $30,068 $28,101 $27,709 -6.5% -1.4% -7.8%
53212 $22,695 $22,634 $25,973 -0.3% +14.7% +14.4%
53216 $32,637 $30,791 $29,978 -5.7% -2.6% -8.2%
53218 $31,157 $28,308 $27,470 -9.1% -3.0% -11.8%
53233 $18,562 $17,124 $18,323 -7.7% +6.5% -1.3%
Inner City 
Total 
$26,536 $25,387 $25,795 -4.3% +1.6% -2.8%
Source: CED Analysis of Wisconsin State Department of Revenue, Statistics on Income, special tabulations.  
 
Although income per taxpayer in the zip codes constituting Milwaukee’s 
“traditional” inner city grew modestly after 1999, income data confirm the 
hypothesis that Milwaukee’s inner city has been expanding territorially since the 
early 1990s to encompass portions of the city’s Northwest Side. Table 8 displays real 
income per taxpayer since 1990 in the four zip codes on the Northwest side.16 Since 
1990, inflation-adjusted income per taxpayer for the Northwest Side as a whole has 
declined by a substantial 8.6 percent, and, unlike the “traditional” inner city, income 
decline has continued on the Northwest Side since 1999.17  The biggest deterioration 
in Northwest Side taxpayer income –double digit declines since 1990-- occurred in 
zip codes 53218 and 53223, neighborhoods running north from W. Congress Street 
to County Line Road, and west from Sherman Boulevard to 84th Street. The 
neighborhoods of zip codes 53218 and 53223 represent an unmistakable belt of 
income decline, stretching from the northwest corner of the “traditional” inner city 
(53218) to neighborhoods directly north (53223).  
 
                                                     
16 Zip code 53218 is located on the Northwest Side, and therefore included in these Northwest Side calculations. Note, 
however, that 53218 is also included in the “traditional” inner city calculations, because it is one of the city’s nine 
“CDBG” zip codes.  
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17 The one exception is zip code 53224, located on the far northwest corner of the city, which has become in the past 
decade a favored residential location for Milwaukee’s small black middle class. In fact, the income gains in 53224 
somewhat mask the true extent of decline on the Northwest Side. If we exclude 53224 from the calculations, real 
income per taxfiler has declined by 11.5 percent since 1990, and by 3.8 percent since 1999 alone.  
Table 8: 
Income Trends in Milwaukee’s Northwest Side, 1990-2004 
(Real income per tax return in inner city zip codes, in constant 2004 dollars) 
Zip Code 1990 
Income 
1999 
Income 
2004 
Income 
%change, 
1990-1999 
% change, 
1999-2004 
%change, 
1990 -2004
53218 $31,157 $28,308 $27,470 -9.1% -3.0% -11.8%
53223 $43,225 $40,174 $37,939 -7.1% -5.6% -12.2%
53224 $38,854 $36,997 $40,546 -4.8% +9.6% +4.4%
53225 $35,797 $33,155 $32,709 -7.4% -1.3% -8.6%
NW Side 
Total 
$36,752 $33,949 $33,581 -7.6% -1.1% -8.6%
Source: Same as Table 7 
Taken as a whole, incomes on the Northwest Side remain substantially above the 
inner city average, as well as above the average for the entire city of Milwaukee (see 
Table 11). It would be a gross exaggeration to declare the entire Northwest Side a 
“new” inner city, particularly in light of the income gains exhibited in the solidly 
middle-class far northwest corner of the area (zip code 53224). But, the substantial 
income decline on the Northwest Side, particularly in the neighborhoods 
geographically closest to the “traditional” inner city, leads to the unavoidable 
conclusion that inner city economic conditions have been radiating north and west 
from Milwaukee’s “inner core” since 1990.18 Especially when analyzed in tandem 
with the employment data we reviewed earlier, there is no gainsaying the severe 
economic distress that has begun to take hold in sections of Milwaukee’s Northwest 
Side. At the very least, portions of the Northwest Side must now be viewed as part of 
Milwaukee’s inner city, facing the social and economic challenges common to inner 
cities across the country.  
In short, the income data reveal a territorial remapping of Milwaukee’s inner 
city, rather than any genuine economic gains since 1999. The in-migration of some 
relatively affluent households (gentrification) and out-migration of the poor from the 
traditional inner city has led to small neighborhood income improvements since 
1999. However, these slender gains have been accompanied by the unmistakable 
beginnings of a transformation of the Northwest Side from a solid middle-class 
enclave to a geographic magnet for poor households leaving the traditional inner 
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18 Attentive readers will recall that “inner core” was the label given by the Zeidler administration in the 1950s to the 
economically distressed northside neighborhoods at the heart of today’s “inner city.” 
city. As a result, there has been no net gain in the battle against poverty and 
economic decline in Milwaukee: indeed, for the city as a whole, real income per 
taxpayer declined by 1.2 percent between 1999 and 2004 (see Table 9). Moreover, 
according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, poverty in the city increased between 
2000-2004 from 18.8 percent to 26.0 percent, a stunning surge of 38.3 percent in 
Milwaukee’s poverty rate.19   
At best, since 1990 Milwaukee has witnessed a deconcentration of poverty from 
traditional ghetto;20 but, as we have seen, the migration of low-income households 
has resulted in declining incomes and growing poverty in wide swaths of the 
Northwest Side, effectively creating an embryonic “second” inner city there. Thus, in 
terms of real income growth, the economic state of Milwaukee’s inner city remains 
highly troubled. Since 1990, as Table 9 shows, both the “traditional” inner city and 
the “emerging” inner city on the Northwest Side saw real income per taxpayer fall, 
while all other jurisdictions in metropolitan Milwaukee registered increases (ranging 
from a modest 1.0 percent for the city of Milwaukee as a whole, to 20.1 percent for 
the WOW counties containing Milwaukee’s exurbs).  Since 1999, as we have noted, 
the traditional inner city, for a variety of reasons, posted a slight gain in real income 
per taxpayer (+1.6 percent); but, this increase was more than counterbalanced by the 
falling real income (-3.8 percent) recorded in the three zip codes of the Northwest 
Side (53218, 53223, and 53225) that increasingly look like an emerging inner city.21  
 
 
                                                     
19 United States Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey (2000 and 2004). The American Community Survey 
(ACS) is a relatively new estimate of social and economic trends in cities, based on annual population samples. The 
reliability of the ACS  –compared to the decennial census—on indicators such as city poverty rates or household 
income -- remains to be determined. For example, the precursor to the ACS –the Census 2000 Supplementary Survey—
estimated Milwaukee’s individual poverty rate at 18.8 percent, compared to the full census’ figure of 21.3 percent (in 
1999). Thus, city poverty estimates should be analyzed with caution. To compare “apples to apples” here, I’ve used the 
supplementary survey figure for 2000 to compare with the ACS 2004 poverty estimate. 
20 Paul Jargowsky found that the percentage of Milwaukee blacks living in “high poverty” census tracts (high poverty 
tracts defined as containing 40% or more of the population in tract living in poverty) declined from 64.6 percent to 38.1 
percent between 1990 and 2000. See Jargowsky, Stunning Progress; Hidden Problems: The Dramatic Decline of 
Concentrated Poverty in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2003), p. 17.  Nevertheless, despite 
this deconcentration, Milwaukee’s city-wide poverty rate declined by less than one percent between 1990 and 2000 (and 
has risen sharply since 2000). And, on the Northwest Side, poverty increased from 13 percent to 20 percent between 
1990 and 2000, with the number of tracts on the Northwest Side with poverty rates above 20 percent jumping from three 
to six during the decade. One Northwest Side tract had a poverty rate of 47.8 percent in 2000. See Levine, Economic 
State of Milwaukee’s Inner City, 1970-2000, p.  29. 
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21 For the entire Northwest Side (including the middle class zip code 53224), real income fell by 1.1 percent between 
1999-2004 (see Table 9).  
Table 9: 
Income Trends in Selected Areas of Metro Milwaukee, 1990-2004 
(Real income per tax return in selected areas, in constant 2004 dollars) 
Area 1990 
Income 
1999 
Income 
2004 
Income 
%change, 
1990-1999 
% change, 
1999-2004 
%change, 
1990 -2004
Inner City $26,536 $25,387 $25,795 -4.3% +1.6% -2.8%
NW Side $36,752 $33,949 $33,581 -7.6% -1.1% -8.6%
City of 
Milwaukee 
$29,620 $30,290 $29,922 +2.3% -1.2% +1.0%
Milwaukee 
County 
Suburbs 
$47,756 $53,688 $51,978 +12.4% -3.2% +8.8%
WOW 
Counties 
$52,428 $61,785 $62,978 +17.8% +1.9% +20.1%
Source: Same as Table 7 
Therefore, it is not surprising that income per taxpayer in Milwaukee’s inner city 
–both in the traditional ghetto neighborhoods as well as in the emerging inner city on 
the Northwest Side— continues to lag substantially behind the rest of the Milwaukee 
region. As Tables 10 and 11 show, income per taxpayer in the traditional inner city is 
now less than half that of taxpayers in the Milwaukee County suburbs and just 41.0% 
of the income of taxpayers in the exurban “WOW’ counties.  On the Northwest Side, 
taxpayer incomes in 2004 were only 53.3 percent of taxpayer income in the exurban 
“WOW’ counties, a substantial decline from 70.1 percent in 1990. These are massive 
income gaps that signify deep economic polarization in the region. 
Table 10: 
Inner City Income Compared to Selected Areas of Metro Milwaukee: 1990-2004 
Inner City Income per taxpayer as % of income in: 
Place 1990 1999 2004 
City of Milwaukee 89.6 83.8 86.2
Northwest Side 72.2 74.8 76.8
Milwaukee County Suburbs 55.6 47.3 49.6
WOW Counties 50.8 39.9 41.0
Source: Same as Table 7 
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Table 11: 
Northwest Side Income Compared to Selected Areas of Metro Milwaukee: 1990-2004 
Northwest Side Income per taxpayer as % of income in: 
Place 1990 1999 2004 
City of Milwaukee 124.1 112.0 112.2
Inner City 138.5 133.7 130.2
Milwaukee County Suburbs 77.0 63.2 64.6
WOW Counties 70.1 54.9 53.3
 
In sum, income data show an inner city that remains poor and continues to lag 
behind the rest of the region. Notwithstanding recent rhetoric among civic boosters, 
income trends give little sign that Milwaukee’s inner city is becoming more 
“competitive,” or that “market-driven” development is lifting the incomes of inner 
city residents. Quite the contrary: the income data reveal the extent to which 
Milwaukee’s inner city faces a grave economic crisis and requires new, innovative 
policy approaches. We will have more to say on this policy issue below. 
 
Business Development in the Inner City, 1994-2003 
A final indicator with which to gauge economic development trends in the inner 
city is the number of businesses located in the area. County Business Patterns 
reports the number of business establishments located in zip codes.  An 
“establishment” is defined as a single physical location where business is conducted 
or services or industrial operations are performed. The number of establishments is 
an imperfect indicator of economic activity in a neighborhood: clearly, economic 
activity could be more robust in a neighborhood with a few large employers as 
opposed to one with many small establishments with few employees.22 Nevertheless, 
viewed in context with employment and income indicators, the establishment data 
give us another metric on economic trends in the inner city. 
Table 12 presents data on the number of business establishments in the nine 
“CDBG” zip codes of Milwaukee’s inner city between 1994 and 2003, the most 
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22 A good example of this possibility, in reverse, is north side zip code 53216, which experienced a 32.9% employment 
decline between 1999-2003 while the number of business establishments in the neighborhood remained stable. Large 
layoffs at Tower Automotive and Eaton could not be counterbalanced by employment in small neighborhood 
businesses.  
recent data available.  The number of inner city business establishments sharply 
declined in the 1990s, followed by a small increase since 1999.  Between 1994 and 
2003, the number of establishments in the inner city declined by 7.5 percent; 
however, all of the decline occurred between 1994-1999, and since 1999, the number 
of establishments has grown by almost two percent. Nevertheless, the number of 
business establishments located in the inner city in 2003 was well below the number 
operating there a decade earlier, not exactly a sign, as former Mayor John O. 
Norquist constantly opined, that would-be entrepreneurs are responding, in large 
numbers, to the “market opportunities” of the inner city.  
Table 12: 
Business Activity in Inner City Zip Codes, 1994-2003 
(Number of business establishments, by zip code) 
Zip Code 1994 1999 2003 % change, 
1994-1999 
% change, 
1999-2003 
%change, 
1994-03 
53204 748 680 660 -9.1% -2.9% -11.8%
53205 141 125 124 -11.3% 0.8% -12.1%
53206 210 200 218 -4.8% +9.0% +3.8%
53208 558 495 511 -11.3% +3.2% -8.4%
53210 413 365 371 -11.6% +1.6% -10.1%
53212 642 616 646 -4.0% +4.9% +0.6%
53216 530 443 439 -16.4% -0.9% -17.2%
53218 487 444 470 -8.8% +5.8% -3.4%
53233 351 341 335 -2.8% -1.8% -4.6%
Inner City 
Total 
4,080 3,709 3,774 -9.1% +1.8% -7.5%
Source: CED analysis of U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, establishment data by zip 
code, 1994-2003.   
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The business establishment data also confirm the growing economic difficulties 
of Milwaukee’s Northwest Side. Between 1994 and 2003, the number of 
establishments declined by almost seven percent on the Northwest Side. Among the 
Northwest Side zip codes, only 53224 – the middle-class enclave on the far 
northwest corner of the city—saw an increase in the number of business 
establishments operating in the neighborhood. 
 Table 13: 
Business Activity in Northwest Side Zip Codes, 1994-2003 
(Number of business establishments, by zip code) 
Zip Code 1994 1999 2003 % change, 
1994-1999 
% change, 
1999-2003 
%change, 
1994-03 
53218 487 444 470 -8.8% +5.8% -3.4%
53223 894 838 703 -6.3% -16.1% -21.4%
53224 335 350 420 +4.5% +20.0% +25.3%
53225 454 466 427 +2.6% -8.4% -5.9%
NW Side 
Total 
2,170 2,098 2,020 -3.3% -3.7% -6.9%
Source:  same as Table 12 
 
Table 14 puts the trends in business growth in the “traditional” inner city and the 
Northwest Side in the context of trends elsewhere in the Milwaukee region. Once 
again, the data confirm the economic performance gap separating the inner core of 
Milwaukee from the exurban communities on the regional periphery. Only the 
“WOW Counties” (Waukesha, Ozaukee, and Washington) experienced growth in the 
number of business establishments between 1994 and 2003 (+15.0%). Even 
downtown Milwaukee, one of the bright spots in the city’s economy, saw a small 
shrinkage in the number of establishments during this period, as did all of 
Milwaukee County.23 Nevertheless, as Table 14 reveals, on this measure of 
economic performance, both the “traditional” inner city and the embryonic “second” 
inner city on the Northwest Side have lagged considerably behind the rest of the 
region since 1994.  
On the other hand, the encouraging news in the data is that since 1999, inner city 
growth in the number of business establishments has exceeded growth in the rest of 
the region, including the WOW counties (+1.8 percent in the inner city versus +1.5 
percent in the WOW counties). Again, the data need to be put in context: the growth 
in inner city establishments between 1999-2003 was counterbalanced by losses on 
the Northwest Side during this period (as well as by losses in the “traditional” inner 
city between 1994-1999). Nevertheless, the more recent numbers do provide 
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23 Even though employment increased downtown by almost six percent between 1994-2003 –see Table 3). 
Establishment data for the city of Milwaukee as a whole is not available from County Business Patterns. 
encouragement that, at the very least, business development in the inner city may 
have stabilized after years of sharp decline. 
Table 14: 
Business Growth in Selected Areas of Metro Milwaukee, 1994-2003 
(Number of business establishments in selected areas) 
Area 1994 
 
1999 
 
2003 
 
% change, 
1994-1999 
% change, 
1999-2003 
% change, 
1994-2003 
Inner City 4,080 3,709 3,774 -9.1% +1.8% -7.5%
NW Side 2,170 2,098 2,020 -3.3% -3.7% -6.9%
Downtown 
Milwaukee 
2,502 2,510 2,413 +0.3% -3.9% -3.6%
Milwaukee 
County  
22,109 21,394 21,037 -3.2% -1.7% -4.8%
WOW 
Counties 
16,226 18,383 18,655 +13.2% +1.5% +15.0
Source: Same as Table 12 
 
Conclusions—and Some Policy Implications 
Our analysis of trends in employment, income, and business development leads 
to one overriding conclusion: Milwaukee’s inner city continues to face severe and, as 
yet, unalleviated economic distress. On all indicators, inner city neighborhoods have 
experienced decline since the early 1990s. Although inner city economic conditions 
have shown modest improvement since the end of the 1990s, the gains were slight 
compared to the losses of the 1990s, leaving the inner city in worse shape today than 
a decade ago. Many of the gains since 1999 have been concentrated in just two or 
three inner city zip codes –particularly those where gentrification has occurred-- 
leaving the rest of the inner city in continuing decline. Moreover, as we have pointed 
out, the gains in the inner city since 1999 may have been more apparent than real, 
reflecting a “remapping” of economic distress in Milwaukee as low-income residents 
left the “traditional” inner city for an embryonic “second” inner city in sections of 
the Northwest Side. Clearly, as the surge in poverty in Milwaukee since 2000 
underscores, our expanding inner city continues to suffer from low-incomes, anemic 
job growth, and sluggish economic activity. 
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As early as 1960, a report prepared for Mayor Frank Zeidler identified severe and 
growing problems in Milwaukee’s “inner core;” yet, for the next thirty years, the 
inner city suffered from a not-so-benign neglect as social and economic conditions 
deteriorated, particularly in the 1980s.24 Milwaukee has been the site of numerous 
“inner city” initiatives since the early 1990s, yet the results have been limited, at 
best, in reviving inner city neighborhoods and improving economic opportunity for 
inner city residents. Community organizations have worked, often heroically and 
almost always with insufficient resources, to jump- start neighborhood economies. 
National and local foundations have funded numerous neighborhood economic 
development projects as well as broader, multi-neighborhood initiatives; since the 
mid-1990s, for example, we’ve seen the “Milwaukee Jobs Initiative,” the “Making 
Connections” project, and the “Initiative for a Competitive Milwaukee.” And city 
government has spent millions, mostly through the Community Development Block 
Grant program, to support neighborhood revitalization programs. All of these 
programs (except the Initiative for Competitive Milwaukee –more on that below) can 
point to tangible successes on inner city projects; yet, as the data on employment, 
income, and business growth reveal, Milwaukee’s inner city crisis endures and broad 
revival remains elusive. 
Inner city economic development policy across the country today is increasingly 
influenced by two broad approaches. One strategy, promoted by Harvard business 
professor/consultant Michael Porter, argues that inner city revitalization programs 
have failed in the past because they have been too oriented towards “social services,” 
have failed to involve the private sector, and have been inhibited by excessive city 
regulation of private businesses. According to Porter, inner cities have considerable 
“competitive advantages” (cheap and available labor and land, central location, and 
unmet consumer markets) that would attract private reinvestment if cities nurtured a 
pro-business climate.  “Utilizing the forces of the marketplace and the resources of 
the private sector, [Porter] believed there had to be a way to restore the economic 
health of our inner cities and create jobs and opportunities for residents.”25
 
 
                                                     
24 See Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Final Report to Mayor Zeidler 
(Milwaukee, 1960). For analysis of inner city decline in the 1980s, see Levine, The Economic State of Milwaukee’s 
Inner City: 1970-2000.   
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25 Initiative for a Competitive Inner City, “Overview of the Initiative for a Competitive Inner City,” in Thomas D. 
Boston and Catherine L. Ross (eds), The Inner City: Urban Poverty and Economic Development in the Next Century 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 225. 
Thus, in the late 1990s, Porter launched another of his consulting ventures, the 
“Initiative for a Competitive Inner City” (ICIC), to promote his version of ghetto 
capitalism around the country.  Financed in partnership by the Helen Bader 
Foundation and the Greater Milwaukee Committee, Porter’s team was brought into 
Milwaukee in 2001 to develop an “Initiative for a Competitive Milwaukee (ICM),” 
modeled on the “market-driven,” competitive inner city principles enunciated by 
Porter. Nearly three years ago, with great fanfare, the ICM was launched. Mayor 
Tom Barrett has warmly embraced the initiative, touting it as a centerpiece of 
Milwaukee’s inner city revitalization strategy. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel has 
published several supportive articles and editorials, praising ICM as a new and 
innovative “economic” approach to inner city decline.26 Corporate leaders have 
endorsed the ICM and promised financial support; indeed, the Greater Milwaukee 
Committee touted its sponsorship of ICM as a sign of its new commitment to 
revitalizing Milwaukee’s inner city. 
Nearly three years after its launch, however, the ICM remains moribund. It has 
already gone through two executive directors and failed to implement any significant 
job creation and business development programs. There is little sign that the 
initiative will make any meaningful contribution in the near future –if ever—in 
alleviating Milwaukee’s inner city economic crisis.27  
This is not surprising: beyond the ICM’s obvious implementation problems, at its 
heart are a series of fallacious assumptions and flawed premises. First, the ICIC is 
based on an astonishingly mistaken read of urban history. As noted above, Porter 
argues that “past efforts have been guided by a social model built around meeting the 
needs of individuals” and that “government can assume a more effective role by 
supporting the private sector in new economic initiatives.”28  However, as Susan 
Fainstein and Mia Gray point out, fifty years of urban revitalization programs, from 
the urban renewal projects of the 1950s to the “empowerment zones” and “enterprise 
communities” of Bill Clinton in the 1990s “have contained one constant element – 
                                                     
26 One article offered a starry-eyed account of how Michael Porter had been “drawn to Milwaukee as a laboratory of 
urban change,” conveniently ignoring the fact that Porter’s “interest” in Milwaukee was at least partially piqued by the 
rumored $500,000 consulting fees paid to ICIC. See John Schmid, “Sowing Jobs,” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 6 
December 2004. 
27 Milwaukee is not the first city to experience implementation difficulties with an ICIC program: Baltimore had a 
similar experience with a pilot ICIC program that, in the end, never got off the ground.  
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28 Michael Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” p. 55, 67. 
their basis in an unswerving faith that the private sector holds the key to urban 
revitalization. Thus, although the forms of governmental programs have changed and 
the levels of subsidy have gyrated wildly, their purpose has always been the same – 
to renew the interest of private investors in places from which capital has fled 
(emphasis added).”29 Urban redevelopment policy in Milwaukee and elsewhere has 
consistently been driven by what one political scientist felicitously called “investor 
prerogative;”30 indeed, a central criticism of these policies has been that, while 
providing incentives and benefits to businesses, they have failed to deliver for low-
income residents in poor neighborhoods.  
In short, there is nothing new or innovative about Porter’s call for a “business-
oriented” strategy of inner city economic development: this has been standard 
operating procedure since the 1950s. The economic decline of inner cities in 
Milwaukee and across the country was not caused by a failed “social services” 
strategy or an aversion to businesses; on the contrary, it was the result of market 
forces and private sector (dis)investment decision-making that Porter offers no 
strategy on how to reshape. Despite decades of “business incentives” programs, 
designed to stimulate private reinvestment in the inner city, the outflow of capital has 
not been stanched; thus, there is little plausible reason to think that Porter’s call for a 
new set of business incentives, coupled with exhortations that the inner city is 
“competitive” and “open for business,” will succeed in stimulating reinvestment 
where previous business incentives programs have failed. In fact, as we pointed out 
earlier, public investment and public employment have been central to stabilizing 
Milwaukee’s inner city economy in the face of massive private disinvestment.  No 
serious observer denies the ultimate centrality of private investment in reviving inner 
city communities; the question is how to encourage that investment in ways that 
improve the living standards of low-income residents rather than simply enriching 
speculators or investors. The Porter “prescription” has nothing to say on this central 
issue. 
A second key flaw in the Porter approach is conceptual.  In his seminal 1995 
Harvard Business Review article, Porter argued that although incomes may be 
                                                     
29 Susan S. Fainstein and Mia Gray, “Economic Development Strategies for the Inner City: The Need for Governmental 
Intervention,” in Thomas D. Boston and Catherine L. Ross (eds), The Inner City: Urban Poverty and Economic 
Development in the Next Century (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 29. 
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30 Clarence Stone, Regime Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989). 
relatively low in the inner city, the population density of inner city neighborhoods 
produces surprisingly high aggregate incomes and aggregate purchasing power.  As a 
result, claim Porter and his followers, the inner city has a latent “competitive 
advantage” in attracting businesses, particularly retail establishments drawn to dense 
consumer markets with “vast” untapped demand. The City of Milwaukee 
Department of City Development has wholeheartedly endorsed this analysis, posting 
neighborhood Purchasing Power Profiles on their web site that purport to show 
greater potential consumer demand in Milwaukee’s inner city than exists in many 
suburban locations in Greater Milwaukee. The city apparently believes that by 
posting such profiles retailers, who had heretofore avoided the inner city market, will 
see the errors in their analysis of various markets and will be drawn to the inner city. 
A retail-led inner city economic revival presumably would be the result. 
This analysis fails, however, on several levels. First, if aggregate purchasing 
power is truly a competitive advantage, it has been eroding in Milwaukee’s inner 
city since 1990.31 Stagnant real income coupled with large population losses has 
actually produced declining aggregate income and therefore declining aggregate 
purchasing power in the nine zip codes of the “traditional” inner city since 1990: as 
Table 15 shows, aggregate income in the inner city, adjusted for the effects of 
inflation, fell by 15.5 percent between 1990 and 2004.32 In zip codes 53218, 53223, 
and 53225 --the portions of the Northwest Side that constitute the core of 
Milwaukee’s embryonic “second” inner city—real aggregate income fell by a 
staggering 19.1 percent between 1990-2004.33
On the other hand, as Table 15 illustrates, this inner city decline occurred at the 
same time that real aggregate income skyrocketed in many suburban municipalities 
(as population grew and residents’ incomes soared). Thus, aggregate income in 
                                                     
31 In fact, this alleged purchasing power advantage has been eroding since at least the 1970s. Aggregate household 
income, adjusted for inflation, declined by 33.9 percent in the inner city between 1979 and 1989. Aggregate purchasing 
power in the inner city was substantially higher in the 1970s than it is today, and population density was significantly 
greater. Yet disinvestment, retail decline, and commercial abandonment all accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Manifestly, advantages in density and aggregate purchasing power did not generate a surge in inner city development in 
the 1970s and 1980s; why should these factors, all greatly reduced since the 1970s, result in a “competitive advantage” 
today? See Levine, The Economic State of Milwaukee’s Inner City: 1970-2000, pp. 39-40. 
32 And real aggregate income in the inner city declined by 10.0 percent during the 1999-2004 period alone, despite a 
slight uptick in real income per taxpayer during those years, a sign of the ongoing depopulation of the traditional inner 
city. 
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33 For the entire Northwest Side, including the middle-class zip code 53224, real aggregate income fell by 15.8 percent 
between 1990-2004. 
Milwaukee’s inner city declined in both relative and absolute terms since 1990, 
which doubly disadvantaged these neighborhoods in attracting businesses. Retailers, 
looking for the most robust consumer markets, will be drawn to “where the money 
is,” and increasingly that is in the suburban and particularly exurban communities of 
metro Milwaukee. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that since 1990 the number of 
retail establishments plummeted in the inner city and on the increasingly poor 
Northwest Side, while retail growth continued unabated in suburban and exurban 
communities. The number of retail establishments fell by 16.9 percent in the 
traditional inner city and by a whopping 38.0 percent on the Northwest Side between 
1994-2003,34 according to the zip code compilations of the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
County Business Patterns; conversely, the number of retail establishments increased 
by 9.8 percent in the WOW counties during this period. 
Table 15: 
Aggregated Adjusted Gross Income in Selected Communities in Metro Milwaukee, 
1990-2004 
(in constant 2004 dollars) 
(in 000 dollars) 
Location 1990 Real AGI 2004 Real AGI % change, 1990-2004
Inner City Zip Codes 2,719,535 2,297,172 -15.5%
Northwest Side 1,999,584 1,683,462 -15.8%
Brookfield 1,481,323 1,804,376 +22.7%
Mequon 870.715 1,510,346 +73.6%
New Berlin 875,179 1,183,991 +35.2%
Delafield 295,297 582,428 +97.3%
Germantown 308,438 529,972 +71.7%
Franklin 528,562 893,501 +69.1%
Oak Creek 404,288 750,096 +85.6%
Menomonee Falls 684,812 966,570 +41.2%
Cedarburg 419,356 563,919 +34.5%
Source: State of Wisconsin, Department of Revenue, Statistics on Income, 1990 and 2004. 
 
Establishment counts do not give us a gauge of actual retail sales activity at these 
locations, but given the larger and more numerous retail establishments located in the 
suburban and exurban communities, it is plausible to assume that the retail sales gap 
between the suburbs and the inner city grew significantly between 1994 and 2003 as 
well. 
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34 The size of the decline on the Northwest Side is no doubt a function of the demise of the Northridge mall during this 
period. 
Local news accounts have rightfully highlighted as positive elements in the inner 
city economy such recent developments as the rebuilding of Capitol Court into a 
viable retail center and the discovery of inner city markets by franchises such as 
Walgreen’s, Osco, and Wal-Mart. But, the overall economic significance of these 
developments, while encouraging, should not be overblown. As critics have pointed 
out, these types of retail development offer questionable value of as anchors of long-
term, family-supporting job creation.  Indeed, in the absence of living-wage 
ordinances, such businesses –offering low-wage, low-benefit, often part-time 
employment—may actually contribute toward the crisis of low incomes and poverty 
in the inner city. In the last analysis, whatever the economic development value of 
these particular retail investments, retailing remains anything but robust in 
Milwaukee’s inner city, especially compared to other areas in metro Milwaukee. If, 
as the ICIC model purports, there is a “competitive advantage” in a huge “untapped” 
inner city consumer market, retailers, on the whole, seem to have had a hard time 
finding it in Milwaukee.35  
The other chief conceptual problem with the inner city “purchasing power” 
strategy is the reliance on aggregate income as a measure of demand. Inner city 
families do not collectively pool their income and go shopping as an aggregate unit; 
therefore, the meaningful measure of neighborhood purchasing power is the 
discretionary income of individual households. In 2001, the Washington, D.C.-based 
Economic Policy Institute in conjunction with the UW-Madison Center on 
Wisconsin Strategy identified $37,300 as the income level necessary to sustain a 
“basic family budget” in metro Milwaukee (i.e. to cover food, housing, child care, 
health insurance, transportation, and utilities).36 Yet, as we saw in Table 7, there was 
                                                     
35 Porter, who otherwise extols the magic of private markets, attributes this market “failure” to “information 
imperfections” – in other words, that potential investors are misinformed about the true potential of inner city retailing. 
It’s an odd contradiction: on the one hand, Porter believes the competitive advantages of the inner city are palpable, yet 
the private investors – in whom he places so much faith for inner city revival— somehow are unable to view those 
opportunities. (He blames, incredibly, the media for this “misinformation”). Usually, in economic policy, the solution to 
market failure is governmental intervention; yet, Porter views the heavy-hand of government as an impediment to 
efficient inner city markets – another weakness in his approach. See Porter, “An Economic Strategy for America’s Inner 
Cities: Addressing the Controversy,” in Thomas D. Boston and Catherine L. Ross (eds), The Inner City: Urban Poverty 
and Economic Development in the Next Century (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 312.  
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36 Economic Policy Institute, Hardships in America: The Real Story of Working Families (Washington, D.C.: EPI, 
2001). 
not a single zip code in the inner city in 2004 in which income per tax return37 
approached this “basic family income.”38 For the inner city as a whole, taxpayer 
income was only two-thirds of this low-income threshold. In other words, there 
simply are not many tax filers with considerable discretionary income – that is, 
income available after spending on necessities—to sustain a robust consumer market. 
This explains why retail development continues to lag in the inner city, not “urban 
myths” or other such nonsense propagated locally by some followers of “Porterism.”  
In sum, the “unmet consumer demand” argument is a thin reed on which to build 
an inner city economic development strategy, and misleading aggregate “purchasing 
power” studies steer policymakers in unproductive directions. The chief impediment 
to retail and other business development in the inner city is simple, yet daunting: the 
low incomes of residents. The challenge for policymakers is develop strategies to 
raise residents’ incomes – then retail will follow. Unfortunately, the Porter 
prescription gets the sequence backwards by putting retail development first, and 
offers nothing to address the fundamental challenge of raising the low incomes in the 
inner city.39
Other elements of Porter’s ICIC model are potentially interesting, but still 
problematic. In particular, his emphasis on linking the inner city economy to the 
wider regional economy and employment clusters is promising, although he fails to 
specify any non-governmental implementation mechanism for such regional 
linkages. Moreover, establishing such linkages is especially difficult when market 
forces continue to pull business and population to the periphery of metropolitan 
areas, ever more distant –and inaccessible—to the inner city poor; yet, the Porter 
prescription contains no strategies to combat regional sprawl. The lack of a thought-
out implementation strategy in the ICIC model is abundantly clear in Milwaukee, 
where the ICM has accomplished nothing in its nearly three years of existence. 
Presumably Porter believes that employers, who have systematically disinvested in 
                                                     
37 Typically, income per tax return is lower than the more standard measure of family income or household income (see 
Appendix). Nevertheless, the measures are reasonably comparable and, in any event, the gap between the “basic family 
budget” and average income per taxpayer is sufficiently large to compensate for this measurement variation (see note 
38). 
38 Adjusted for inflation between 2001 and 2004, the EPI “basic family budget” for Milwaukee in 2004 dollars would be 
$39,911. As Table 7 showed, income per taxpayer in Milwaukee’s inner city was only $25,795 in 2004. 
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39 In fact, given the low wages paid in retail, as well as Porter’s aversion to government regulation (presumably, to 
policies such as “living wage” ordinances), the Porter prescription could be a recipe for exacerbating the problem of low 
incomes in the inner city. 
the inner city over the past thirty years, will now rapidly respond to the incantation 
of inner city “competitiveness,” and, once properly informed, will recognize the 
error of their ways and shift their investment patterns.  There is little evidence, 
however, that such exhortations will be effective. Ironically, some of the corporate 
sponsors of the ICM have been responsible for the biggest job losses in Milwaukee’s 
inner city since the 1990s, suggesting a less than full faith on their part regarding the 
“competitive advantages” of the inner city.  
In the last analysis, a major governmental role will be necessary to help reshape 
metropolitan markets, guide private investment, and implement any effective inner 
city-regional linkages program. The Porter prescription seriously misapprehends the 
degree to which private markets have devastated –and continue to devastate—inner 
cities, and misunderstands the central role of government planning and public 
investment in alleviating this market failure. In the end, despite exaggerated claims 
of a new, “economic strategy” for inner city redevelopment, Porter and the ICIC 
offer the same tired prescription of business incentives and deregulation that has 
historically failed to reverse flows of capital and jobs in metropolitan areas.  
The other main approach to the economic crisis of inner cities is the so-called 
“new regionalism.” Promulgated nationally by writer/consultants such as David 
Rusk and Myron Orfield, as well as the Brookings Institution Center for 
Metropolitan Studies, the chief premise of the new regionalism is straightforward:  
after five decades of relentless suburban sprawl and outflow of capital and jobs, 
older, historically industrial cities –and, in particular, their inner cities—lack the 
resources to tackle successfully the myriad economic challenges with which they are 
confronted.40 As urban scholars Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd 
Swanstrom put it:  
Even with the best of intentions, local political leaders, whatever 
their political orientation, face overwhelming obstacles in trying 
to reduce poverty within their boundaries. The realities of urban 
finance and economics limit even the most progressive city 
officials…[They] cannot require suburbs to build affordable 
housing for the central-city poor. Nor can they require suburban 
employers to hire poor city residents or force metropolitan 
transportation agencies to reorganize their routes and schedules 
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40 David Rusk, Inside Game/Outisde Game: Winning Strategies for Saving Urban America (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1999); and Myron Orfield, Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community Stability 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). 
to help urban residents get to suburban jobs. Most suburbs also 
have an advantage in the competition to attract middle-class 
residents, such as better schools, lower property taxes, and more 
efficient public services.41
 
In short, the new regionalists argue that the fiscal and jurisdictional straitjacket in 
which cities like Milwaukee find themselves makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
cities, on their own, to solve the problems generated by economic segregation and 
regional sprawl. In his book Inside Game, Outside Game, David Rusk argues that in 
older, historically industrial cities, neighborhood revitalization programs  – what he 
calls the “inside game”—have generally failed to reverse the tide of inner city 
decline. “Playing only the ‘inside game’ is a losing strategy for even the most 
exemplary players,” argues Rusk. “For both poverty-impacted cities and poverty-
impacted neighborhoods, even the strongest inside game must be matched by a 
strong ‘outside game’” – by which Rusk means metropolitan-wide, regional policies 
of various types.42 In particular, Rusk and other “new regionalists” focus on four 
main regional strategies to help revive inner cities and fight urban poverty: 1) control 
sprawl, through regional land use policy; 2) deconcentrate poverty, by opening up 
suburbs with affordable housing for low-income residents; 3) reduce fiscal 
disparities, through tax-base sharing policies often modeled on Minneapolis-St. Paul; 
and 4) link workers to jobs, by improving regional transportation connections 
between the inner city and suburban employment growth centers. 
As a policy approach, the new regionalism offers a potentially exciting way for 
cities to escape the fiscal constraints that heretofore have limited the efficacy of inner 
city revitalization efforts. However, the new regionalism is not without its critics. For 
example, as David Imbroscio points out, although Rusk offers a penetrating critique 
of “inside game” strategies, he and other new regionalists fail to provide any 
convincing evidence of the efficacy of “outside games” (i.e. regional strategies) in 
alleviating inner city distress. Moreover, the new regionalists have yet to offer a 
plausible case for the political viability of “metropolitics;” in particular, it remains 
highly questionable, absent some compelling self-interest,43 whether suburban and 
                                                     
41 Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom, Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-first Century. 
Second edition, revised (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), p. 154. 
42 Rusk, Inside Game/Outside Game, p. 13. 
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43 Like gaining access to a city’s water, perhaps? 
exurban residents –and hence their political leaders-- will support regional equity 
policies designed, in part at least, to help rebuild the urban core of the region. This is 
especially true if suburbanites perceive that new regionalism will raise their taxes. 
On the other hand, for central city residents, there may be reasons to be leery of new 
regional structures that might dilute residents’ control of their own institutions and 
services.44
Notwithstanding these criticisms --and the very real political impediments to 
regionalism—it is difficult to envision a successful Milwaukee inner city 
revitalization strategy that does not involve at least some form of regional policy. 
Therefore, it is at least somewhat encouraging that “regionalism” has become part of 
local discourse. Milwaukee’s two business organizations, the Metropolitan 
Milwaukee Association of Commerce (MMAC) and the Greater Milwaukee  
Committee (GMC) have articulated their support for “regionalism” (without defining 
precisely, in terms of institutions and policies, what they mean by regionalism). 
Mayor Tom Barrett, reversing decades of reticence on part of Milwaukee mayors to 
engage in regional initiatives, has also weighed in on the importance of regional 
“cooperation” (although once again, the precise contours of such cooperation remain 
unspecified).45  
Unfortunately, however, Milwaukee’s “new regionalism” thus far has offered 
nothing that would contribute to inner city revitalization. The major new regional 
initiative is the so-called “Milwaukee 7” project, in which the seven counties of 
southeastern Wisconsin46 join together in a “Regional Economic Council” whose job 
will be “to package the many individual strengths of the seven southeastern 
Wisconsin counties…and market the region as a whole.”47 The core of the 
“Milwaukee 7” initiative is a five-year, $12 million marketing campaign, to “brand” 
the region, improve its image, and sell it to businesses shopping for new locations. 
So far, the “Milwaukee 7” initiative has produced lots of rhetoric about regional 
“cooperation,” “competitiveness,” and “marketing,” but absolutely nothing about 
                                                     
44 David L. Imbroscio, “Shaming the Inside Game: A Critique of the Liberal Expansionist Approach to Addressing 
Urban Problems,” paper presented at annual meeting of Urban Affairs Association, April, 2005, Salt Lake City. 
45 We should also note the role of the Public Policy Forum, through conferences and reports, in pushing issues of 
regional policy onto the metro area’s political radar screen.  
46 The four counties of metro Milwaukee plus Kenosha, Racine, and Walworth counties. 
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harnessing regional economic dynamism to meet the region’s central economic 
challenge: Milwaukee’s distressed inner city.48
Mayor Barrett, in explaining the city’s support for the initiative, stated: “I need 
more family-supporting jobs in this community. I recognize that the city needs the 
suburbs and the suburbs need the city,” and that a job gained in the region will be 
“everyone’s” gain.49 Well, not exactly. As we examined earlier (see Table 4), almost 
all of the net job growth in metro Milwaukee between 1994 and 2003 –around 
51,000 jobs—occurred in the exurban WOW counties. Yet, few inner city residents 
secured any of exurban these jobs, and there was no discernible “trickle down” 
benefit for the inner city, as jobless rates there for working age black males remained 
over 50 percent.  
The new rhetoric about regional cooperation is charming, but if the Milwaukee 7 
“marketing” campaign succeeds in luring employers to Walworth county –or, for 
that matter, to the exurban communities of metro Milwaukee—the economic benefits 
for inner city residents will be nil, as was the case in the 1990s. Inner city residents 
will benefit from suburban growth only if explicit policies are put into place, such as 
regional transportation investments that better link the inner city to suburban 
employment centers, or tax-base sharing so that the benefits of growth are shared 
equitably throughout the region.  Unfortunately, there is little sign that Mayor Barrett 
is prepared to advocate, or that Milwaukee’s corporate and suburban leadership are 
prepared to embrace, the types of regional equity policies that could truly enhance 
the economic prospects of the inner city. Milwaukee’s inner city challenges go well 
beyond the ameliorative capacity of “branding strategies” or a new regional image.  
So what is to be done? Clearly, there is no panacea to the economic crisis of the 
inner city. Although there are many programs from “best practices” around the 
country that have contributed to neighborhood renewal, there is no singular approach 
that has proven to be transforming in its impact on inner cities. Nevertheless, from 
the experience in Milwaukee over the past decades, as well as the record from cities 
                                                     
48 Perhaps an inner city strategy will be part of the Milwaukee 7’s “economic positioning strategy,” promised for 
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around the country, here are some modest –and not-so-modest-- suggestions for 
inner city economic renewal policy in Milwaukee: 
1) Milwaukee needs a comprehensive inner city redevelopment and anti-poverty 
strategy. The city of Milwaukee has numerous inner city projects underway, and city 
government has developed renewal plans for several individual inner city 
neighborhoods. But, the city lacks a comprehensive inner city strategy, a master 
plan, for example, on the order of the downtown plan developed in the late 1990s. 
Such a strategy would coordinate investments in infrastructure, housing, 
transportation, business incentives, and workforce development in a targeted attack 
on poverty and unemployment in inner city neighborhoods –including, given trends 
over the past decade, areas of the Northwest Side. Coordination is hardly a cure-all, 
but too frequently these cornerstones of economic development are either poorly 
sequenced or insufficiently comprehensive to dramatically influence neighborhood 
development. Development of a comprehensive inner city economic development 
plan should be the top priority of public policy in Milwaukee. Additional resources 
should be directed towards community development corporations that show the 
capacity for innovative, multi-neighborhood strategies that produce family-
supporting jobs. And a proactive city industrial strategy should especially target 
manufacturers already operating in the inner city, others who might relocate in the 
inner city, and package available city, state, and federal resources that might help 
them remain competitive and sustain family-supporting employment. In addition, 
city industrial strategy should target economic development resources toward 
sectoral clusters that have the highest competitiveness and job creation potential in 
Milwaukee. (The city’s Menomonee Valley plan, taking advantage of central 
location and infrastructure investments and targeting “living wage” manufacturers, is 
a good start towards a citywide industrial strategy).   
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2) Metro Milwaukee should embrace regional equity strategies. There are many 
potential virtues in regionalism: efficiency in services, coordination in multi-
jurisdictional infrastructure, and economic competitiveness are three that are often 
mentioned by advocates. However, as political scientist Norton Long argued more 
than forty years ago: “The apostles of metropolitanism are coming to realize that the 
vision they are seeking is something more than a better means of moving traffic, an 
improvement in the plumbing, or even an increase in the competitive position of the 
local economy. It is the possibility of attaining a shared common goal of a better 
life.”50 As we have noted, the approaches currently circulating in Milwaukee stress 
the potential economic “competitiveness” gains of regional cooperation; but neither 
the “Milwaukee 7” nor the MMAC Blueprint for Economic Prosperity have 
anything to say about inner city decline or regional equity. At a minimum 
Milwaukee should embrace the three main strategies for regional equity outlined by 
David Rusk: sprawl control, deconcentrating poverty by “opening up” the suburbs, 
and reducing fiscal disparities between the central city and suburbs. In particular, 
some form of regional tax-base sharing should be established, similar to the one in 
the Twin Cities, to enhance the resource base available to simulate economic 
development in the inner city. The PolicyLink think tank has inventoried hundreds 
of programs from around the country constituting “best practices” in regional equity 
policy. Instead of obsessing about ways to “brand” Milwaukee, perhaps the newly-
created Regional Economic Council could review these best practices and adapt the 
most promising ones to the Milwaukee setting.51 
3) Corporate Milwaukee needs to step up to the plate for the inner city. 
Milwaukee’s corporate leadership needs to become much more involved in helping 
develop strategies and in providing resources for inner city renewal.  The MMAC, 
for example, rolled-out its Blueprint for Economic Prosperity in 2004; one looks in 
vain in the Blueprint, amidst all of the standard business lobbying proposals of 
deregulation and tax cuts, for a concrete inner city revitalization strategy (save for 
the MMAC panacea of school vouchers). The GMC, of course, has invested heavily 
in the  “Initiative for a Competitive Milwaukee” (ICM), but as we have noted, the 
ICM has already demonstrated serious flaws in theory and in practice; today, almost 
three years after its launch, ICM has contributed nothing to inner city renewal. 
Ironically, many GMC corporate members who are sponsors of ICM have also been 
responsible for substantial lay-offs and plant closings in and around Milwaukee’s 
inner city over the past decade. Here’s a novel strategy for the GMC to pursue: find 
ways to persuade its own members of the “competitive advantages” of the inner city. 
The GMC could contribute mightily to inner city economic development by helping 
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its members avoid inner city shutdowns and/or layoffs, and by persuading members 
to relocate from exurbia to the inner city. Finally, Milwaukee’s corporate leadership 
can play an indispensable role in promoting regional equity policies. The vast 
majority of GMC and MMAC corporate members live outside of the city of 
Milwaukee; thus, they are strategically placed, by geography as well as their status 
in the metro economy, to make the case to suburban and exurban policymakers on 
the importance to the entire region of policies to revitalize the inner city. 
4) The City of Milwaukee should rethink some of its economic development 
strategies. In particular, the wasteful capital spending on tourism infrastructure in 
Milwaukee over the past decade –over a billon dollars on a baseball stadium and a 
convention center—has severely damaged the local economy and diverted potential 
resources from inner city revitalization and other worthwhile investments (i.e. roads, 
schools, or housing). “Few fields of empirical economic research offer virtual 
unanimity of findings,” write economists John R. Siegfried and Andrew Zimbalist. 
“Yet, independent work on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has 
uniformly found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between 
sports facility construction and economic development.”52 Some economists go even 
further, finding that public spending for sports teams actually reduces regional per 
capita income.53 As for convention centers, Heywood Sanders’ comprehensive study 
for the Brookings Institution shows how virtually all centers built or expanded since 
the mid-1990s have underperformed –including Milwaukee’s which now attracts 
fewer conventioneers than did the facility it replaced in 1998.54  
Whatever the original economic folly of Miller Park and the Midwest Airlines 
Center, what’s done is done: both facilities exist and will certainly operate for the 
foreseeable future. For the purposes of this study, there is no point in reopening a 
historical debate about whether public dollars should have been spent on these 
facilities. However, down the road, as part of a city strategy to build a chimerical  
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tourist industry in Milwaukee, taxpayers once again may be called upon to provide 
public funding for an expanded convention center, or perhaps a new arena for a local 
professional sports team. Such expenditures should be scrupulously avoided: tourism 
has been a losing economic development strategy for Milwaukee as a whole, and for 
the inner city, tourism investments have represented a huge “opportunity cost’ of 
funds that could have been invested in inner city economic renewal.  Milwaukee 
needs to reorient its economic development strategy from building a “city for 
visitors” to one that makes rebuilding the inner city our top public policy priority.  
5) Restructuring the Milwaukee Department of City Development will be essential 
to implementing an inner city revitalization strategy. DCD is the key city agency 
entrusted with economic development responsibilities. However, DCD has often 
confused real-estate deal-making and land development with economic 
development; nowhere was this more evident than in the PabstCity fiasco of 2005 
when DCD pushed hard for a $41 million public subsidy for a developer’s proposal 
that independent economic analysis showed would have created a trivial number of 
mostly low-wage jobs. The agency has done a good job of working out the details 
and implementing plans brought forward by developers, exerting particular influence 
since the Norquist years on the architectural face of development in the city. 
However, DCD’s planning capacity is woefully inadequate, and consequently DCD 
has devoted little time or energy to some of the standard elements of economic 
development planning found in cities around the country: identification and 
nurturing of export-industries in the city; targeting of import-substitution industries 
for future job development; supporting sectoral “clusters” that promise high-growth 
and family-supporting jobs in the future; and developing job-creation strategies in 
inner city neighborhoods. DCD needs to shift away from deal-making and land 
development, towards economic development planning that focuses on the creation 
of family-supporting jobs in neighborhoods. As James Rowen nicely put it: “Imagine 
a Department of City Development recast as an anti-poverty engine, with a top 
priority on jobs.”55 Exactly. 
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6) Community benefits agreements should be standard components of 
development deals in Milwaukee. As redevelopment continues in downtown 
Milwaukee and surrounding neighborhoods, the city should maximize the 
employment possibilities for inner city residents. Historically, one of the central 
weaknesses of traditional economic development policy has been that incentives and 
subsidies have gone to private developers often with little evidence that low-income 
residents have benefited from these policies. In a growing number of cities around 
the country, “community benefits agreements” (CBAs) have been attached to major 
redevelopment projects, to give preferential hiring to inner city residents and to 
require developers receiving public subsidies to meet job creation and wage 
standards. CBAs offer a way to enhance the prospects of inner city residents to 
secure living-wage employment as a result of redevelopment in the city.     
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7) Gentrification is not a dirty word. As we have pointed out in this report, some of 
the apparent improvement in economic indicators in some inner city neighborhoods 
has clearly been a consequence of gentrification: the in-migration of relatively 
affluent households. Although gentrification is a complicated phenomenon, it is 
essential for the future of the city and its neighborhoods that Milwaukee attracts 
middle-class and affluent households.  Gentrification improves the city’s tax base, 
enhances local consumer markets (promoting retail business growth), and helps 
break down the economic segregation that increasingly separates the city from its 
more affluent suburbs. The key, of course, is to ensure that gentrification is not 
accompanied by widespread displacement in which neighborhood residents are 
uprooted to make way for the gentrifiers, left more or less to fend for themselves and 
relocate to another poor neighborhood. Gentrification has clearly transformed 
neighborhoods such as Brewers Hill and Walker’s Point, and mechanisms should put 
in place to cushion whatever displacement inevitably accompanies gentrification. 
But, Milwaukee has not nearly reached the stage of cities such as Chicago, Boston, 
or San Francisco, where the widespread “reclamation” of inner city neighborhoods 
has resulted in mass displacement. Between 1995-2000, the most recent years for 
which city migration data are available, the number of relatively affluent households 
($75,000 and over annual income) leaving the city of Milwaukee outnumbered the 
ones moving here by a ratio of 3-1 (11,140 newcomers vs. 33,010 leavers). For 
households moving only within the metro Milwaukee region, the ratio of leavers to 
newcomers in the city was 4-1.56 Thus, although there may be pockets of 
displacement in Milwaukee, the city as a whole continues to lose middle-class and 
affluent households. Clearly, a goal of public policy should be to attract these 
residents to the city; in the last analysis, the inner city along with the entire region 
will benefit from an economically diverse city of Milwaukee. 
8) Milwaukee needs a “big bang” to stimulate inner city revitalization. Public 
investment must be an essential ingredient in the revitalization of the Milwaukee’s 
inner city. In the past, public investment (in the form of highway expenditures and 
suburban housing subsidies) helped channel investment away from inner cities and 
accelerate the process of inner city economic decline. Today, with market forces still 
working in large measure against inner cities, public investment will be vital, both to 
stimulate inner city redevelopment (in a Keynesian, pump-priming sense), and 
reshape regional investment flows (to encourage investment in inner city locations). 
Major investments in renewed infrastructure –schools and roads, for example, badly 
in need of replacement and renovation—would not only create jobs for inner city 
unemployed, but could also enhance the long-term economic competitiveness of the 
inner city.  
In particular, Milwaukee’s regional leaders should consider emulating Denver, 
which just approved a $4.3 billion bond issue for a twenty-year regional rail transit 
program. A regional light rail system, anchored in downtown Milwaukee and with 
routes through the inner city, could knit the region together and stimulate station-area 
reinvestment in inner city neighborhoods and elsewhere. Most importantly, such a 
major investment, combined with regional growth management strategies, could help 
slow down suburban sprawl, shape regional land use in economically productive and 
environmentally sound ways, and help encourage private reinvestment in the urban 
core.  
These eight ideas hardly exhaust the range of new policies that could help 
revitalize Milwaukee’s inner city economy. Moreover, although the current political 
climate would not seem propitious, substantial aid from the state and federal 
governments will probably be necessary for the kinds of investments we have 
suggested. 
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However, the time has come for Milwaukee’s leaders to acknowledge the 
seriousness of Milwaukee’s ongoing inner city crisis, and to recognize that business-
as-usual will no longer suffice. The ideas we have proposed may serve as a useful 
starting point for rethinking inner city strategy in Milwaukee. But, whatever the 
value –or political viability—of the specific strategies we have identified, the 
important thing is that we begin a vigorous, open, and democratic debate on inner 
city policy in Milwaukee. Now. 
 Appendix 
 
The U.S. Bureau of the Census provides data on household income for 
neighborhoods, measured either at the census tract or zip code level, only in the 
decennial census. The relatively new American Community Survey provides 
household income estimates at only the city, county, and metropolitan area level, and 
therefore cannot be used for gauging post-census household income trends at the 
neighborhood level.   
Thus, to examine neighborhood income trends in non-census years requires 
different data sources. This study uses income data reported by tax filers and 
available from the State of Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR), which is 
available on an annual basis. Special tabulations by DOR for the UWM Center for 
Economic Development broke down the income per tax filer by zip codes for 1990, 
1999, and 2004 (the most recent year available), to make possible the analysis of 
income trends in geographical breakdowns approximating neighborhoods.  
The DOR income data are not strictly comparable to census data on household 
income. The DOR data include “Wisconsin adjusted gross income” (WAGI) which 
roughly equals federal adjusted gross income plus certain additions, such as state and 
municipal bond interest, and minus certain subtractions, such as U.S. government 
bond interest and excluded long-term capital gains. WAGI is less than personal 
income, as estimated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, because not all persons 
are required to file tax returns and because certain income, such as a portion of social 
security benefits, is included in personal income, but not WAGI. Finally, WAGI per 
return is not necessarily equivalent to household income, because tax-filing units do 
not necessarily correspond to households; several members of a single household 
may file tax returns. 
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An example of how these technical caveats play out in practice: For the city of 
Milwaukee, in 1999 income per tax filer was $30,290 (in 2004$) according to data 
provided by DOR; median household income that year, according to the census, was 
$35,437 (in 2004$).  
